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WHEN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
VIOLATIONS ARISE UNDER THE LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES
Gwynne Skinner *
INTRODUCTION

O

ne question that the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide is whether non-statutory, common law claims for violations
of the law of nations, or customary international law, 1 arise under the
“laws of the United States” for purposes of both general federal question
jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) 2 and Article III 3 of the U.S. Constitution,
the Article which sets the outer limits of federal judicial authority. A similarly unanswered question is whether, even if such claims fall within
federal jurisdiction, federal courts can recognize and provide remedies
for such claims as a matter of their common law power; in other words,
whether a federal court can entertain a claim that is not based on a statutory cause of action. These questions are inextricably intertwined with
another largely unsettled issue: the precise role of customary international law in our domestic legal system and, in particular, its specific status
as federal common law. Scholars continue to debate whether federal
* Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law. M.St. (LL.M. equivalent) International Human Rights Law, Oxford University, with Distinction; J.D. University of Iowa, with High Distinction; M.A., American Studies, University of Iowa; B.A.,
Political Science, University of Northern Iowa, Highest Honors.
1. The terms “law of nations” and “customary international law” are used interchangeably in this Article. The “law of nations” is generally equated with customary international law. The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 298, 307–08 (1819) (referring to non-treatybased law of nations as the “the customary . . . law of nations”); see also Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2010) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
3. Article III of the United States Constitution sets forth the outer limits of federal
judicial power. Section 1 provides, in relevant part: “The Judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (Federal judicial
power shall extend to nine different categories, including: 1) to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; 2) all cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; 3) to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; 4) to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; 5) to Controversies between
two or more States; 6) between a State and Citizen of another State; 7) between Citizens
of different States; 8) between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States; and 9) between a State or Citizens thereof and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.).
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courts have the authority to incorporate customary international law as
part of federal common law wholly, partially, piece-meal, or not at all.
This Article concludes that common law claims for violations of customary international law arise under the “laws of the United States” for §
1331 general federal question jurisdiction and within Article III, but only
where such claims or defenses implicate uniquely federal interests, such
as foreign relations. This position is not taken because the law of nations
is, or historically has been, part of the “laws of the United States” for
Article III and § 1331 purposes. On the contrary, the law of nations
probably was not considered to be the “law of the United States” per se
when Article III and § 1331 each were enacted.4 Rather, this position is
taken for two reasons. First, certain enclaves of federal common law
have developed over time to include certain norms and rules of customary international law, and federal courts have the judicial authority to continue to develop such law when uniquely national interests are at stake.
This remains true even after Erie v. Tompkins. 5 Second, federal common
law has evolved to become “law of the United States” for purposes of
both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Thus, it is not customary international law per se that is law of the
United States for purposes of Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Rather, it
is federal common law, which incorporates some aspects of customary
international law, that is considered “law of the United States” for purposes of Article III and § 1331. This is an important distinction because
federal common law is now arguably “law of the United States” as contemplated by Article III and § 1331, whereas customary international law
is not. Hence, claims alleging violations of customary international law
that affect uniquely federal interests are properly characterized as federal
common law claims, giving rise to federal question jurisdiction under
current Supreme Court precedent of Milwaukee v. Illinois6 and Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co. 7
Additionally, this Article maintains that federal courts have the common law power to recognize and thus provide remedies for customary
4. That the law of nations per se was not considered to be the law of the United
States for Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 purposes at the time each was enacted does
not provide an answer regarding whether the federal courts have the power to incorporate
aspects of customary international law into federal common law, or to use their federal
common law power to recognize tort claims for customary international law violations,
where such claims affect uniquely federal interests.
5. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts did not
have the judicial power to create general federal common law when adjudicating state
law claims under diversity jurisdiction).
6. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
7. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).

2010]

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.

207

international law violations where the same uniquely federal interests are
involved, notwithstanding the lack of a statutory basis for such claims.
This is because Congress implicitly authorized such private claims due to
its understanding when it enacted § 1331 that federal courts would use
their common law powers to provide remedies for federal common law
claims. Though the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism regarding
whether federal courts have jurisdiction over customary international law
claims under § 1331 analogous to that provided by the Alien Tort Statute, this Article concludes that the Court’s skepticism most likely relates
to concerns about federal courts using their common law powers too
broadly, thereby recognizing claims in a vast array of areas unrelated to
uniquely federal interests or with regard to actions Congress never intended or understood when it enacted § 1331. Such broad and unintended
use of federal common law powers would likely not be consistent with
Erie. However, use of common law power to recognize and provide remedies only for those claims of customary international law violations
that entail uniquely federal areas arguably would be consistent with Erie.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the current debate regarding the role of customary international law within federal common law
and whether customary international law is “Law of the United States”
for purposes of Article III. This overview helps set the stage for the remainder of the Article. Part II of this Article addresses the unanswered
question of whether claims for violation of customary international law
“arise under” the Constitution or “laws” of the United States for purposes
of Article III and § 1331. It concludes that Congress probably did not
consider the law of nations per se to be law of the United States. However, federal common law, which did not exist when Article III was drafted
and was only in its infancy when § 1331 was enacted in 1875, later developed to include aspects of customary international law.
Part III of this Article addresses a related, but ultimately distinct question regarding the common law power of federal courts to recognize private causes of action for customary international law violations consistent with the Erie decision. 8 It also addresses the Supreme Court’s skepticism articulated in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 9 regarding whether federal
courts are authorized to recognize claims for customary international law

8. This issue overlaps and is intertwined with the issue addressed infra Part II. As
such, it is difficult to address each issue separately. However, whether a court has jurisdiction over such causes of action is ultimately a separate, albeit intertwined, question
from whether a court has the power to recognize the claim and provide a remedy absent
statutory authorization.
9. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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violations under § 1331 in the same manner as they would under the
Alien Tort Statute. 10
I. THE CURRENT DEBATE
Although near consensus has emerged in the lower federal courts that
customary international law is “part of the federal common law,” 11 scholars disagree about its precise role in the U.S. legal system. In addition,
although the Supreme Court in Sosa may have agreed with the proposition that certain customary international law norms are actionable
through federal common law claims, it did not specify its views regarding the contours of customary international law in our federal judicial
system. The Court indicated only that “domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations.” 12
A. Role of Customary International Law within Federal Common Law
Two predominant schools of thought have emerged regarding the role
of customary international law within the domestic law of the United
States: those who advocate the so-called “modern” position, and those
who support the so-called “revisionist” position. Although there are
slight differences among the modernist scholars’ positions, their general
view is that federal law incorporates customary international law. 13 Most
modernists agree with the revisionists that customary international law
was considered general common law early in this country’s history (the
10. Id. at 731 n.19 (holding that although the federal courts could use their common
law power to recognize aliens’ tort claims for a limited set of violations of the “law of
nations” under the jurisdictional Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), “a more expansive common
law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331” might not be consistent with the division of responsibilities between state and federal courts after Erie v. Tompkins).
11. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992); Igartúa-De
La Rosa v. United States 417 F.3d 145, 177–79 (1stCir. 2005). In addition, “customary
international law is considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is federal law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 111 cmt. d (1987).
12. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added).
13. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295 (1994); see also William Casto, The New
Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 635 (2006); William Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S.
Legal System after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87 (2004)
[hereinafter Dodge, Bridging Erie]; Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm
Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
463, 472 (1997); Harold Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824, 1825 (1998); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 435–36 (1997).
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concept of federal common law did not exist at the time). 14 However,
modernists argue that federal common law later developed and came to
incorporate customary international law, emerging as a clear enclave of
federal common law after the Erie decision. 15 They do not believe that
Congress has to explicitly authorize the federal courts to incorporate customary international law into federal law because federal courts already
have the common law power to do so. 16
The revisionists argue that federal common law has never incorporated
customary international law. 17 They further claim that after Erie, customary international law can only become part of federal common law
when Congress specifically authorizes its incorporation. 18 The revisionists assert that the law of nations was historically part of the general
common law, but unlike the modernists, they do not believe that the law
of nations ever became part of federal common law. 19 To the degree that
it did, they argue that the Erie decision ended the ability of federal courts
to incorporate customary international law without explicit congressional
authorization. 20
After the Sosa decision, two of the best known revisionists, Professors
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, along with Professor David Moore,
wrote an article in the Harvard Law Review, arguing that the Supreme
Court in Sosa agreed with the revisionists’ views. 21 This was evidenced,
they argued, by the Court’s holding that either the legislative or the executive branch must authorize federal courts to apply customary international law before the courts can do so and that the Alien Tort Statute

14. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 13; Stephens, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 13, at 471–72; Stephens, supra note 13, at
436.
16. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 13, at 471–72; Stephens, supra note 13, at 436.
17. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815
(1997) [hereinafter Bradley &Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S.
Courts—Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 807 (1998) [hereinafter
Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts].
18. See Bradley &Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law, supra note 17, at 817–20.
19. Id. at 823.
20. Id.
21. Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie,120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873, 894
(2007) [hereinafter Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law,
and the Continuing Relevance of Erie].

210

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:1

(“ATS”) 22 provides the requisite authorization, albeit on a limited basis. 23
Other scholars have been very critical of this position, claiming that Sosa
held the opposite: that courts do not need explicit authorization to apply
customary international law when adjudicating cases before them. 24
B. Whether Customary International Law is Part of the Laws of United
States Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution
The revisionists argue that the framers did not intend Article III to include the law of nations, claiming that the law of nations was part of the
general common law and not part of the “Laws of the United States” for
purposes of Article III. 25 Moreover, the revisionists emphasize the omission of the phrase “law of nations” from Article III. 26 They compare this
to the inclusion of the phrase in Article I, which states that Congress has
the power to “define and punish . . . [o]ffences against the Law of Nations.” 27 The revisionists argue that this inclusion in Article I demonstrates that the framers did not intend the law of nations to be within the
purview Article III. 28 They further note that Article III extends the federal judicial power to treaties and that Article VI declares treaties to be the
supreme law of the land, though neither mentions the law of nations.29
Finally, they point out that an early draft of Article III would have ex-

22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010) (stating that federal district courts have jurisdiction over
tort claims brought by aliens for violations of the law of nations).
23. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, supra note 21.
24. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Sosa, the Federal Common Law and Customary International Law, Reaffirming the Federal Courts’ Power, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 269
(2007). In my view, the modernists are correct. The Court made it clear that no specific
authorization was required for federal courts to incorporate certain aspects of customary
international law as federal common law. Instead, the Court suggested that the necessary
element was the authorization, albeit implicit, for plaintiffs to be able to seek a remedy.
Such implicit authorization can be granted through Congress’s understanding that upon
enactment of a jurisdictional statute, courts will use their common law power to recognize a claim and provide a remedy. See discussion infra Part III, pp. 37–39.
25. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law, supra note 17, at 823, 824; Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, supra note 21, at 875; Bradley,
The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note 17, at 812.
26. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law,
supra note 17, at 824–27.
27. Id. at 819–20; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law, supra note 17, at 819.
29. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note
17, at 820.
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tended federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under the “Law of Nations,” but that the reference was deleted (although without any apparent
explanation). 30
The debate concerning whether customary international law is part of
the “Laws of the United States” under Article III also arises in the context of the constitutionality of the ATS when the defendant is an alien. 31
Revisionists, such as Professor Bradley, argue that claims for violations
of the law of nations under the ATS do not fall under Article III’s “arising under” provision, but rather are encompassed under Article III’s alienage jurisdiction. 32 This would mean that claims brought by an alien under the ATS against another alien would not be constitutional under Article III. Bradley argues that Congress either mistakenly believed that
Article III’s alienage provision extended to any suit involving aliens even
where both parties were aliens, or Congress intended to limit suits to
those where the defendant was a U.S. citizen. 33 Although Bradley sets
forth evidence that supports both possibilities, he favors the latter.34
Modernists take the opposite position, agreeing with the Second Circuit in the ground-breaking ATS case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 35 which
held that claims for violation of the law of nations brought pursuant to
the ATS arise under the “Laws of the United States” for purposes of Article III jurisdiction. 36 Professor William Dodge cites numerous documents and certain federalist papers in arguing that, at the time Article III
was drafted, Congress viewed the law of nations as “Law of the United
States” for purposes of Article III, albeit not through what we now recognize as federal common law. 37

30. Id. at 820 n.82 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 157
(Max Farrand ed. 1911) (other internal citations omitted).
31. Claims brought pursuant to the ATS by an alien against a citizen would be constitutional under Article III given the alienage jurisdiction of Article III.
32. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587,
590–92 (2002) [hereinafter Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III]; see also Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830,
835–40 (2006).
33. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III, supra note 32, at 590–92.
34. Id. at 627–28.
35. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. See, e.g., Dodge, Bridging Erie, supra note 13, at 102; Goodman & Jinks, supra
note 13, at 475; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1555, 1559–60 (1984).
37. William Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 705–08 (2002) [hereinafter Dodge, The
Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute].
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Professor Dodge also emphasizes the language difference between Article III and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, noting that the latter
refers to “This Constitution, and Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof,” whereas the former only discusses “Laws
of the United States” without reference to “in pursuance thereof.” 38 In
addition, Professor Dodge argues that Congress deliberately struck the
words “passed by the Legislature” from the text of Article III. 39 Given
this, he suggests that there must be a category of laws that are not made
by Congress “pursuant” to the Constitution and yet are “Laws of the
United States.” 40 The most obvious candidate, he suggests, is the law of
nations. 41 Another leading scholar opines that the framers and early jurists believed that “all of the common law pertinent to the enforcement of
the law of nations naturally attached to the federal government upon its
creation.” 42 Thus, the modernists clearly disagree with the revisionists
about whether federal jurisdiction over claims for customary international law violations is consistent with Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
The debate continues with no clear consensus on the horizon.
II. WHETHER COMMON LAW CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISE UNDER LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
PURPOSES OF ARTICLE III AND 28 U.S.C. § 1331
A. Whether the Founders Considered the Law of Nations to be Law of the
United States Under Article III
As described above, one major area of disagreement among scholars is
whether members of the Constitutional Convention intended the “Laws
of the United States” under Article III to include the law of nations. To
be sure, compelling evidence exists to support both sides of this debate,
suggesting there is no clear answer to this question. 43 While there is significant evidence to support the contention that the founders viewed the
law of nations as “Laws of the United States,” a close look at judicial
opinions and other historical material reveals that Congress probably did
not consider the law of nations per se to be law of the United States
when it drafted Article III.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 704.
Dodge, Bridging Erie, supra note 13, at 102.
Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, supra note 37, at 705.
Id.
WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 160 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1995)
[hereinafter CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC].
43. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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1. Evidence Supporting the Contention that the Founders Viewed the
Laws of Nations as “Laws of the United States”
Early prosecutions of federal common law crimes demonstrate that
many of the framers viewed the law of nations as part of the common
law of the United States and, in fact, exclusive to the federal judiciary.
From the late 1700’s until the early 1800’s, the federal government prosecuted citizens for violations of the law of nations, such as piracy, crimes
on the high seas, breaches of neutrality, and attacks on diplomats under
the common law of the United States.44 In these cases, courts routinely
stated that the law of nations was part of the law of the United States.45
These prosecutions came to an end in 1812 46 amidst increasing criticism
of the idea that certain federal common law crimes existed that were not
codified under a statute.47 The criticisms, however, were largely based on
the concern that federal jurisdiction over federal common law crimes
provided Congress with unlimited power over the states.48 That federal
law encompassed the law of nations was not the concern. 49
Three Attorney General Opinions issued in the 1800’s, all of which
stated that the law of nations is part of the law of the United States, further support the proposition that the framers and early jurists viewed the
law of nations as part of the law of the United States.50 Moreover, federal
courts throughout the 1800’s applied the law of nations when adjudicat-

44. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 136–38;
see, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa 1793) (No. 6360).
45. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 131; Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1117 (because the law of nations is part of the common law of
the United States, Henfield and others like him are subject to common law prosecution in
federal court).
46. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812).
47. See, e.g., id. (“Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of
justice from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is
not among those powers.”).
48. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 135, 149–
50, 160.
49. Id.
50. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 566, 570–71 (1822) (stating that the law of nations is part of
“the laws of the country” and “our laws”); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 495, 503 (1855) (“The laws
of the United States [include] the Constitution, treaties, acts of Congress . . . and the law
of nations, public and private, as administered by the Supreme Court, and Circuit and
District Courts of the United States . . . .”); 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) (“That the
laws of the nations constitute a part of the laws of the land is established from the face of
the Constitution, upon principle and authority.”).
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ing civil cases, 51 often stating that the law of nations is “part of the law of
the United States.” 52 For example, the Supreme Court in the 1815 case of
The Nereide states, “[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is
part of the law of the land.” 53 In 1855, the Court in Jecker, Torre & Co.
v. Montgomery, in deriving a rule from the law of nations in a prize case,
also reinforces the view that the law of nations is part of the law of the
United States. 54
Perhaps the most famous case discussing the law of nations as part of
“our law,” is the 1899 case of The Paquete Habana, which states, “International Law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.” 55 These cases, along with the three Attorney General Opinions,
provide evidence that many jurists throughout the 1800’s believed that
the law of nations was part of the law of the United States.
2. The Law of Nations, Per Se, was Likely Not Considered Part of the
Laws of the United States When the Framers Drafted Article III
a. The Law of Nations was Perceived as a Transcendent Body of Law,
Applied by Both Federal and State Courts When They Otherwise had
Jurisdiction
The case decisions and opinions referenced above, however, do not
confirm that the framers believed that the law of nations was law of the
United States, especially with respect to Article III’s jurisdiction provision. Most of the aforementioned decisions and opinions are too far removed temporally to provide much insight about whether the framers
specifically intended Article III’s “Laws of the United States” to include
the law of nations, and the judicial opinions arise in cases where the
Court otherwise had jurisdiction on different Article III grounds, such as
admiralty. Moreover, none of the judicial opinions specifically address
Article III’s reference to the “Laws of the United States” with respect to
the law of nations. In fact, the first case that specifically addressed
whether the “law of nations” arises under Article III’s “Laws of the Unit-

51. For a list of such cases, see Gwynne Skinner, Federal Jurisdiction over U.S. Citizens’ Claims for Violations of the Law of Nations in Light of Sosa, 37 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 53, 102–07 (2008).
52. Id.
53. The Neriede, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
54. Jecker, Torre & Co. v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855).
55. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
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ed States” did not occur until 1871, 56 and involved the Supreme Court’s
appellate review (given that general federal question jurisdiction was not
yet enacted). 57 Rather, these statements likely reflected the courts’ views
that the law of nations was a transcendent body of law (i.e., a type of
general common law) that all courts, federal and state, could apply.
For example, when the federal courts already had jurisdiction on some
other basis, such as admiralty, they applied the law of nations without
any specific authority from Congress. 58 Similarly, state courts throughout
the 1800’s applied certain aspects of the law of nations to cases before
them, typically tort cases that arose out of war. 59 In addition, an 1802
Attorney General Opinion (issued prior to the afore mentioned Attorney
General Opinions supporting the position that the law of nations was
seen as federal law) stated that a violation against the “law of nations”
did not contravene any “provision in the Constitution [or] any law of the
United States,” and that the “the law of nations is considered as part of

56. See Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. 216 (1871); see also discussion infra pp. 24–26.
57. General federal question jurisdiction was not enacted until 1875. Act of Mar. 3,
1875, Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
58. See Skinner, supra note 51, at 57–58; see also Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 1, 7–12 (1868) (where the Supreme Court applied the law of war, which it described as fitting within general principles of law, in holding that a contract for the payment of money in Confederate currency was valid because the contract at issue was used
in the regular course of business and the currency was imposed on the community “by
such irresistible force that the use of them had no purpose in furthering or aiding the rebellion.”); Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 449 (1872) (although referring
to the law of war, the Court again applied principles of what it called “public law” in
finding that a bond issued by the state of Arkansas used to fund the insurgency could not
be consideration as a matter of public policy); Dainese v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 64
(1879) (where the Court of Claims applied the law of nations to determine that a consul
had judicial responsibilities, and thus was entitled to additional pay); United States v.
One Thousand Five Hundred Bales of Cotton, 27 F. Cas. 325 (C.C. Tenn. 1872) (the
Circuit Court applied the law of war to determine whether the proceeds from the sale of
cotton used to aid the rebellion should be forfeited); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 655–94 (1898) (applying international law to settle a question of immigration);Willamette Iron-Bridge Co. v. Hatch,125 U.S. 1, 15 (1888) (where the Supreme
Court did not apply international law per se, but noted that once a federal court has jurisdiction over the issue of whether states can erect bridges that obstruct waterways, it can
apply international law. The Court cited The Wheeling Bridge Case, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
518 (1851), as an example where international law was applied. In addition, the Court
distinguished between common law of the United States and international law, as separate rules of decisions or bodies of law to be applied.); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176,
185–90 (1877) (applying the laws of war extensively in holding that the Confederacy’s
sequestering of a Pennsylvania citizen’s debts as alien enemy was void under the Constitution).
59. See Skinner, supra note 51, at 107–09.
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the municipal law of each State.” 60 The state court opinions, applying the
law of nations and the 1802 Attorney General Opinion, support the view
that the law of nations was simply part of the general common law, applied by courts in appropriate circumstances when they otherwise had
jurisdiction.
Thus, as Professors Bradley and Goldstein have stated, the assertions
about the law of nations being part of the law of the land was “likely
nothing more than a mimicking of earlier statements by Blackstone,” and
are “perfectly consistent with the law of nations’ status as general common law.” 61
b. In Article III, the Framers Provided for Federal Jurisdiction Over
Specific Types of Cases That Would Implicate Foreign Affairs, not
Wholesale Jurisdiction Over the Law of Nations
i. The Framers Agreed to Constitutional Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction
A close examination of the debate concerning federal jurisdiction that
took place during the Constitutional Convention, combined with the
omission of any reference to the “law of nations” in the final draft of Article III, suggests that the framers intended to provide federal jurisdiction
over only those specific areas that they believed implicated federal interests, such as foreign relations. This decision was likely a product of the
ongoing debate concerning the limits of federal power generally, as well
as the limits of federal judicial power. Because the law of nations was
perceived as transcendent, giving the federal judiciary jurisdiction over
all cases involving the law of nations was likely viewed as an invasion of
the states’ rights.
The drafting of the Constitution, as one might expect, was subject to
controversy regarding the role of the federal government, including the
federal judiciary. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the founding
generation was contemplating both the constitutional and initial statutory
scope of a federal judiciary. 62 One of the most significant issues was the
extent of the national courts’ constitutional authority to adjudicate cas60. 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 691, 692 (1802).
61. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law,
supra note 17, at 850, 850 n.227 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 67 (1769) (stating that the “law of nations . . . is held to be a part of
the law of the land”)).
62. See, e.g., CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42;
HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (2d
ed. 1984).
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es—in one word, jurisdiction. 63 Some opposed a strong central government and thus opposed a strong federal judiciary. 64 Others wanted a
strong central government and a strong federal judiciary, which they believed would not only offset tendencies toward “balkanization” of the
states, but would guarantee that national interests would be protected and
advanced. 65
One of the major points of disagreement at the Constitutional Convention was whether inferior federal courts should exist and limits on their
jurisdictional scope. 66 Some framers believed that it was unnecessary and
undesirable to have lower federal courts, arguing that as long as state
courts were subject to appellate review by the Supreme Court, the interests of the national government would be protected.67 Others, however,
distrusted the “ability and willingness of the state courts to uphold federal law,” especially where there might be conflicting state and federal interests. 68 They did not believe that the Supreme Court’s review of certain
state court decisions would be adequate because they feared the number
of such appeals would exceed the Court’s limited capacity to hear and
adjudicate each case. 69
After much debate, the framers reached a compromise with Article III
of the Constitution mandating the existence of the Supreme Court, outlining its original and appellate jurisdiction, and defining the outer limits
of the federal judiciary’s subject matter jurisdiction. 70 Congress could
then later determine whether inferior courts would exist and the scope of
their jurisdiction through enactment of statutes.71 As part of the compromise, the drafters also agreed to refrain from conferring the full extent of
Article III jurisdiction—whatever that would be—to federal courts in
their planned First Judiciary Act. 72
In outlining the constitutional limits on jurisdiction set forth in Article
III, the drafters considered a variety of arrangements that would preserve
local power and protect national interests.73 All of the drafters, even
those supporting limited federal power, sought to ensure that foreign affairs and national security issues were placed within the powers of the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 5.
See FINK & TUSHNET, supra note 62, at 5.
Id.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 3 (3d ed. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 25–26.
Id.
Id. at 12–15.
FINK & TUSHNET, supra note 62, at 3.
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federal government. 74 Thus, each of the draft judiciary plans, although
significantly different in other areas, demonstrated a consensus to grant
federal jurisdiction over cases involving foreign relations, which included admiralty, 75 prize cases, 76 and cases involving aliens. 77
After the Convention passed a resolution stating, inter alia, that “the
jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under
the laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions
as involve National peace and harmony,” 78 a five-person committee
worked out a compromise and drafted Article III. 79 The resulting draft of
Article III created the Supreme Court and outlined nine different categories of cases that future federal courts could ultimately have jurisdiction
over:
1) to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; 2) all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; 3) to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; 4) to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;
5) to Controversies between two or more States; 6) between a State and
Citizen of another State; 7) between Citizens of different States; 8) between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States; and 9) between a State or Citizens thereof and foreign
80
States, Citizens or Subjects.

The compromise also granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over cases affecting diplomats as well as appellate jurisdiction over each
of the nine types of cases outlined in Article III. 81 Of course, these were
the outer Constitutional limits, and Congress still needed to authorize
federal jurisdiction through statutory enactments.
74. See id. at 3, 6–7; CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra
note 42, at 6; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 1231, 1267–68, 1275 (1985).
75. See FINK &TUSHNET, supra note 62, at 6–7; see also CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 7.
76. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 7. Prize
cases involved a court’s condemnation of property seized from commercial enemy vessels during time of war, and the court’s decision about whether such seizure was lawful.
It was an important area of international law in the 18th century that was seen as implicating national security concerns.
77. Id.
78. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 14 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
81. Id.
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ii. Pursuant to the Compromise, the First Judiciary Act of 1789 Provided
Lower Federal Courts with Jurisdiction Over Specific Types of Cases
that Could Affect Foreign Affairs
The resulting Judiciary Act of 1789, 82 while reflecting the agreed-upon
limits on federal jurisdiction, ensured that the federal judiciary would
have jurisdiction over every type of case likely to impact foreign relations. 83 For example, the Judiciary Act reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction over suits involving diplomats.84 With regard to the
lower federal courts, Congress created alienage jurisdiction for claims
over $500, 85 provided exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases involving
admiralty and maritime matters, 86 and provided concurrent jurisdiction
for cases in which aliens bring tort claims in violation of the law of nations. 87 The framers believed that it was critical to ensure federal jurisdiction over aliens’ claims for torts in violation of the law of nations—
which at the time likely included piracy, attacks on diplomats, and safe

82. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §
1257 (West 2010)).
83. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 27–31;
see also Jay, supra note 74, at 1275.
84. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81.
85. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. at 78–79 (The Act allowed for the
removal of cases against an alien defendant for claims in excess of $500 from state to
federal court. The $500 requirement for claims involving aliens was, like nearly everything else, the result of a compromise, which in this case involved the problem of British
debt collections under the Treaty of Paris. By limiting jurisdiction over cases involving
aliens to $500, a large majority of such litigation would be forced to proceed in state
courts, which were much more sympathetic to U.S. citizens); CASTO, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 9. This alienage provision did not comport with Article III’s alienage provision, which required one party to be an alien and one
party to be a citizen. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304
(1809); Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807); Mossman v. Higginson, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 13–14 (1800). This section of the First Judiciary Act was soon deemed
unconstitutional because it did not comport with Article III provisions. It has never been
determined how and why Congress created this apparent inconsistency. See also Bradley,
The Alien Tort Statue and Article III., supra note 32, at 590–91 (suggesting that this inconsistency was likely a legislative oversight).
86. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77 (for a variety of reasons, admiralty jurisdiction in particular was an area over which there was little controversy because
of the need for federal courts to have jurisdiction over prize cases); CASTO, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 40.
87. Id. (now referred to as the Alien Tort Statute).
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passage 88—because those types of violations potentially “threatened serious consequences in international affairs.” 89
However, the founders did not include within federal jurisdiction—
either within Article III or the First Judiciary Act—claims alleging general violation of the law of nations. As mentioned above, the law of nations had been included in earlier drafts of Article III, but it was ultimately removed without an explanation. 90
c. The Federalist Papers Indicate That the “Laws of the United States”
Likely Did Not Include the Law of Nations
Another important source in determining the framers’ intent are the
Federalist Papers—a series of 85 articles and essays likely written by
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocating the ratification of the new Constitution and outlining its philosophy and interpretation. 91 In the Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton, discussing
federal jurisdiction, outlines six areas to which the judicial authority of
the Union ought to extend:
[First], to all those which arise out of the laws of the United States,
passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; [second], to all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of the Union; [third], to all
those in which the Unites States are a party; [and fourth], to all those
which involve the Peace of the Confederacy, whether they relate to the
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves; [fifth], to all those which originate on the
high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; [and] lastly, to
all those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial
92
and unbiased.

After discussing each area in turn, Hamilton examines the draft Constitution, in particular Article III, arguing how each provision of the draft
Constitution fits into the six areas outlined. 93 First, he addresses the provision, “To all cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and
88. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–15 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
89. Id. at 715.
90. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note
17, at 820 n.82.
91. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1–85 (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madison), reprinted in A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Edward
Mead ed., Random House 1937) [hereinafter FEDERALIST PAPERS].
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id., at 520–22.
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the laws of the United States.” 94 Hamilton states that this clause responds
to the “two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States.” 95 He was clearly referring to
the first two of the six areas that he outlined at the beginning of his paper. The first involves “all those which arise out of the laws of the United
States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of
legislation . . . .” 96 Thus, he was clearly referring to laws enacted by
Congress, and not to a more broad conception of “law” that would include the law of nations.
It is also important to note that Hamilton did not find that the “laws of
the United States” clause of Article III satisfied the fourth type of cases—those involving “the peace of the confederacy, whether they relate to
the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations . . . .”97
Had he concluded the opposite, a much stronger argument could be made
that “law of the United States” was intended to include the law of nations. Rather, it was the provisions regarding all cases involving foreigners, as well as the cases involving treaties, that he believed satisfied the
“keeping the peace” class of cases. 98 While the Federalist Papers clearly
advocate that the federal judiciary should have jurisdiction over cases
that might affect foreign affairs,99 nowhere do the Federalist Papers suggest that Article III’s “Laws of the United States” language was intended
to include, or viewed as including, the law of nations. 100
Taking into consideration Federalist No. 80, the final wording of Article III, the extensive areas in which the framers did ensure federal jurisdiction, and the predominant view that the law of nations was similar
to the general common law which both federal and state courts applied, it
is more likely than not that that the framers did not intend that the “Laws
of the United States” provision of Article III would include the law of
nations. It is unlikely that the framers intended to provide for federal jurisdiction over any and all claims involving the law of nations, especially
where national interests would not be implicated by such claims. This is
also consistent with the framers’ desire to limit federal judicial power.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 88–95.
100. See, e.g., FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 91. Notwithstanding the above, it is
important to keep in mind that Federalist Paper No. 80 directly reflects the thinking of
one man, Alexander Hamilton. It is possible that some of the framers intentionally removed the phrase, “passed by the Legislature” from Article III, knowing that it would
leave room for future debate.
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B. Whether Congress Considered the Law of Nations, Per Se, to be Law
of the United States for Purposes of General Federal Question Jurisdiction
It is equally unclear whether Congress intended general federal question jurisdiction to include all cases involving the law of nations. There is
little legislative history regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and virtually no information about what types of claims Congress believed would arise
“under the laws of the United States,” let alone whether the “laws of the
United States” would include the law of nations or even federal common
law. 101 It does seem clear, however, that the manager of the bill establishing federal question jurisdiction and its likely author, Senator Mathew Carpenter, 102 intended for § 1331 jurisdiction be the same as Article
III’s jurisdiction provision. 103 He declared, “The [Judiciary] [A]ct of
1789 did not confer the whole [judicial] power which the Constitution
conferred . . . . This bill does . . . [t]he bill gives precisely the power
which the Constitution confers—nothing more and nothing less.” 104 He
also stated that “[t]he present bill is intended to confer a jurisdiction just
as it is conferred in the Constitution, without that limitation.” 105
There is no evidence that Senator Carpenter believed that Article III’s
provisions per se included the law of nations. Moreover, it is improbable
that he believed that the framers intended Article III to include “federal
common law,” given that federal common law did not exist at the time
that the Constitution was written. But, as discussed in the next Section of
this Article, federal common law began to develop in the latter half of the
1800’s. As such, he and others in Congress probably understood the
“arising under” provision of § 1331 to include claims involving certain
aspects of the common law that implicated federal interests, such as foreign relations.

101. Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason For It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 603 (1987); see also Jay, supra note 74, at 1315; CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 66, at 265.
102. Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter of Wisconsin sponsored and managed the Act of
March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, which, inter alia, established federal question jurisdiction, and was its likely author. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 366 n.22 (1959), superseded in part by statute on other grounds 43 U.S.C.A § 59
(West 2010); 7 RPTS. OF THE WIS. ST. BAR ASS’N 155, 186 (1906).
103. Skinner, supra note 51, at 69–72.
104. 2 Cong. Rec. 4986–87 (1874).
105. Id. at 4986.
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C. Federal Common Law Now Includes Claims Involving the Law of Nations Where Such Claims Implicate Federal Interests
There is agreement among scholars on both sides of the debate that in
the late 1700’s and throughout most of the early 1800’s, the law of nations was considered to be general common law, applied by both federal
and state courts. 106 The concept of federal common law that we recognize today began to emerge in the late 1800’s. 107
1. Development of Federal Common Law in the Late 1800’s
Federal courts began developing their own common law in the 1800’s,
during the time that Swift v. Tyson 108 was decided in 1842. 109 The development of federal common law took place not only in areas of obvious
national interest, 110 such as admiralty, 111 but also in areas typically associated with state interests, such as contracts, agency, insurance, and
torts. 112 As some scholars have noted, the motivation behind recognizing
and developing this type of federal common law was largely economic,
with a desire to create uniform national law to help facilitate commercial
transactions. 113

106. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III, supra note 32, at 595; Jay, supra
note 74, 1266, 1270; Stephens, supra note 13, at 410, 430–31.
107. Stephens, supra note 13, at 410, 430–31.
108. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Swift, the Supreme Court held that in diversity cases, federal
courts should apply “general principles and doctrines” where there was no state statutory
or constitutional provision addressing the claim, thereby supplanting state common law.
Swift, 41 U.S. at 12. In so finding, the Court held that the Rules of Decision Act (28
U.S.C. § 1652), which mandated that state law should apply unless the Constitution, a
treaty, or an Act of Congress otherwise require, did not apply to claims involving contracts and commercial transactions. Id. In addition, the Court noted that “the true interpretation and effect” of the law in these cases should not be found in decisions of local
courts, but in the “general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence” as articulated by federal courts. Id. In effect, the Court ruled that the Rules of Decision Act,
which stated that the laws of the state should apply in the absence of a federal constitutional provision, a treaty, or statute, did not apply to state common law. Id.
109. See Skinner, supra note 51, at 39–40.
110. Stephens, supra note 13, at 430–31.
111. See Skinner, supra note 51, at 41; see, e.g., The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 365
(1885); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20 (1865) superseded in part by statute, Extension of
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 62 Stat. 496 (1948), as recognized in Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); The Lamington, 87 F. 752 (D.C.N.Y.
1898).
112. Skinner, supra note 51, at 40; see also CASTO, supra note 42, at 162.
113. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 309.
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Notwithstanding the development of common law by the federal courts
in these various areas, the Supreme Court stated on numerous occasions
throughout the 1800’s that there was no common law of the United
States. 114 However, it seems clear that those cases stand for the notion
that the common law of England was not inherited by the federal government in the same way that it was inherited by each of the states. For
example, in the 1798 case U.S. v. Worrall, the Supreme Court notes that
the common law of England can be traced to the states but not to the
United States as a national government. 115 The Court continues, “The
common law of England is the law of each State, [in] so far as each state
has adopted it.” 116 The Court further explains in the 1834 case Wheaton
v. Peters that when English citizens came to the U.S., they brought with
them the English common law and while each state adopted English
common law as it saw fit, the federal government did not.117
These cases indicate that the common law referred to in the opinions
was the already-established common law of England. These opinions did
not address whether the federal courts had power to develop common
law in areas unique to the federal government. In fact, federal courts believed that they had the power to create their own common law to aid in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes 118 as well as other
areas including commercial and immigration law. 119
Despite the continued development of common law by federal courts,
many criticized the Swift decision and its progeny. This criticism reflected a tension between the rights of state courts to develop and apply their
own common law in matters of local concern and the recognition that
certain types of common law questions, namely those affecting the nation as a whole, should be decided by federal courts.120 This tension was
on display in two U.S. Supreme Court cases in the 1870’s: the 1871 case
114. See Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 89 (1890); Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co.,
125 U.S. 555, 583–84 (1888); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888); Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834) (“It is clear, there can be no common law of the
United States.”); United States v. Worrall, 28 F.Cas. 774, 779 (1798) (No. 16,766) (“the
United States, as a Federal government, have no common law”).
115. Worrall, 28 F.Cas. at 779.
116. Id.
117. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658–59.
118. See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. at 478–79 (citing Moore v. United States, 91
U.S. 270 (1875)).
119. See, e.g., U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655 (1898); Oates v. Nat’l Bank,
100 U.S. 239, 246 (1879); Rice v. R.R. Co., 66 U.S. 358, 374–75 (1861); Watson v.
Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 519–20 (1855); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 12
(1842).
120. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 13, at 430–31.
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of Caperton v. Bowyer 121 and the 1875 case of New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Hendren. 122 Both cases were more concerned with whether claims
involving the law of nations provided for federal question jurisdiction
rather than the development of federal common law per se in situations
where the federal courts otherwise had jurisdiction.123
However, these cases provided the Court an opportunity, in the context
of the law of nations as jurisdiction-creating, 124 to hear debate about
whether the law of nations was “law of the United States.” 125 The Court
also addressed the issues of whether the common law of the United
States exists separate from general common law and whether it includes
the law of nations. 126 In Caperton, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether international law, and in particular the law of war, was included in “laws of the United States” and, thus, presented a federal question for purposes of the Court’s appellate review.127 Although the Court
ultimately refrained from deciding the issue,128 both parties presented
strong views. The defendant, a confederate provost-marshal sued in tort
by a man whom he had thrown into prison during the civil war (Bowyer),
raised defenses under the law of war. 129 He proposed that his defenses
gave rise to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction because “international law
is a law of the United States, of the nation, and not of the several
states.” 130 The defendant continued, “[t]his indeed must be the law, or the
General Government is at the mercy, on a question of foreign relations,
of the action of a State, or of its courts.” 131
The plaintiff argued that Caperton’s defenses, even if based on international law, did not provide the Court with appellate jurisdiction as “laws
of the United States.” 132 He argued that although both federal and state

121. See Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. 216 (1871).
122. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
123. Id.; Caperton, 81 U.S. at 216.
124. Both cases considered whether the law of nations was jurisdiction-creating under
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction rather than general federal question jurisdiction.
125. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. at 286; Caperton, 81 U.S. at 216.
126. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. at 286; Caperton, 81 U.S. at 216.
127. See Judiciary Act of 1789 ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73 (The Act provided for Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction consistent with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, where “drawn
in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the
ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favour of such their validity . . . .”); see Caperton, 81 U.S. at 216.
128. Caperton, 81 U.S. at 216.
129. Id. at 217, 225.
130. Id. at 225.
131. Id. at 226.
132. Id. at 228.
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courts “recognize the law of nations as binding upon them . . . the law of
nations is not embodied in any provision of the Constitution, nor in any
treaty, act of Congress, or any authority, or commission derived from the
United States.” 133 Notably, the plaintiff conceded that perhaps the Supreme Court should have appellate jurisdiction over cases affecting foreign relations because this is an area of responsibility for the federal government 134—a seeming concession that the development of jurisdictioncreating federal common law in the area of the law of nations affecting
foreign relations might be appropriate. However, he argued that this particular case did not affect foreign relations.135
In 1875, the Supreme Court directly considered whether a claim involving the law of nations presented a federal question for appellate jurisdiction and found that it did not. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren,
the Supreme Court considered the effect of the Civil War upon insurance
contracts. 136 The Court held that no federal question was presented where
the question rested on the general law of nations, unless it was contended
that the general rules had been “modified or suspended” by the laws of
the United States. 137 The Court treated this question as one of general
public law available to and applicable in all courts, but not as one creating a federal question. 138
The opinion drew a vigorous dissent by Justice Bradley, whose opinion
supported an argument for the development of federal common law in
the area of international law. 139 He stated that “international law has the
force of law in our courts, because it is adopted and used by the United
States.” 140 According to Justice Bradley:
[T]he laws which the citizens of the United States are to obey in regard
to intercourse with a nation or people with which they are at war are
laws of the United States . . . [whether these laws] be the unwritten international law . . . or the express regulations of the government, when
it sees fit to make them. But in both cases it is the law of the United
141
States for the time being, whether written or unwritten.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 228–29.
Id.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. at 286.
Id. at 286–87.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 287–88 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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Justice Bradley also noted the importance of ensuring uniformity and the
finality of decision by the national government in these types of matters. 142
Although the majority in Hendren suggested that the law of nations is
not jurisdiction-creating, 143 it did not address whether federal common
law might exist in the area of foreign affairs. Nor did the Court address
any issues that could affect foreign affairs. The majority viewed the case
as wholly domestic. 144 Had the case impacted foreign affairs, one may
wonder if the Court would have reached a different result.
Both the Caperton and the Hendren decisions demonstrate that whether the law of nations was included in the newly-developing federal common law was a live issue at the time Congress enacted federal question
jurisdiction in 1875. 145 The Caperton case had been decided nearly four
years earlier. 146 Hendren was decided in October of 1875, 147 just a few
months after the enactment of § 1331 in March of 1875. 148 Although it is
unclear when the oral argument was heard, certain members of Congress,
including Senator Carpenter, were probably aware that the issue was presented before the Court. Senator Carpenter was recognized as one of the
leading constitutionalists in the nation, having argued several significant
constitutional cases before the Supreme Court.149 Given this fact, it is
difficult to believe that he was unaware of the arguments surrounding
whether the law of nations was federal common law or gave rise to federal appellate jurisdiction under the “Laws of the Unites States.”

142. Id. at 288.
143. Id. at 286 (majority opinion).
144. See id.
145. Id.; Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. 216 (1871).
146. See Caperton, 81 U.S. 216.
147. Id. at 286 (noting that the case was decided during the October term).
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2010).
149. Mathew Carpenter argued his first case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1862. In
1868, he acquired nationwide recognition in Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868),
where he demonstrated his knowledge of complex jurisdictional issues, arguing that Congress had the power to remove the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over certain
habeas corpus cases. His other well-known cases include his representation of the state of
Louisiana in the famous Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (where the Supreme
Court adopted his argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities
clause did not restrict the police powers of the state to centralize all slaughterhouses within the city of New Orleans in order to prevent dumping of remains in waterways.). He
was eventually acknowledged to be the leading legal advocate for reconstruction policies.
Dictionary of Wisconsin History, Carpenter, Matthew Hale, WISCONSIN HISTORICAL
SOC’Y, http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/dictionary/ (follow “Browse People” hyperlink;
then follow “Carpenter, Matthew Hale” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
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Senator Carpenter gave no direct clues, but he indicated a belief that
federal question jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly whenever uniquely federal or national interests were at stake. For example, a review of
his speeches and writings at the time suggest that he opposed expansion
of the federal government’s jurisdiction over state-related matters.150
However, he supported such expansion over the matters that could affect
national interests, including foreign affairs. 151 Thus, it is probable that he
believed § 1331 should in fact include the developing federal common
law, including the law of nations when foreign relations issues were involved. This is especially true given the likelihood of his knowledge and
approval of the developing federal common law in areas of national interests.
2. Continued Development of Federal Common Law in the Area of International Law
Twenty years later, the courts addressed again the emergence of federal common law in the area of international law in the 1894 federal district court case Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry Co. 152 Murray concerned
an action to recover damages for freight transportation rates. 153 The court
held that federal courts are empowered to develop common law principles governing “matters of national control.” 154 It pointed to international law in particular, stating that “[t]he subject-matter of dealing with
other nations is conferred exclusively upon the national government, and
of necessity all questions arising under the law of nations . . . are committed to the national government.” 155 In 1901, the Supreme Court cited
Murray approvingly in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing
Co. 156—a case in which the Court held that it had jurisdiction over
claims involving pricing, applying emerging federal common law to the
case.
The above cases reflect a time in the 1800’s and early 1900’s in which
federal common law was being developed by the courts. The cases demonstrate a struggle to define the federal courts’ proper jurisdiction and its
power to create federal common law, especially after the trend toward
strong federal power after the Civil War. The ultimate conclusion
reached in 1938 by the Supreme Court in Erie v. Tompkins and its proge150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Skinner, supra note 51, at 94–95.
Id.
Murray v. Chicago & N.W, Ry. Co., 62 F. 24 (C.C .N.D. Iowa 1894).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 31–33, 42.
Id. at 32.
See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ’g Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1875).
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ny now seems so obviously simple: in areas of state concern, federal
courts do not have the authority to develop federal common law. 157 Thus,
it naturally follows that in areas of uniquely federal interests, especially
as set forth through the division of responsibilities of the Constitution,
federal courts do have the ability to develop federal common law.
3. “General Federal Common Law” Came to an End with Erie v. Tompkins, but Enclaves Remain.
The 1938 Supreme Court decision of Erie v. Tompkins 158 ended the
expansion of general federal common law. In Erie, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared that federal general common law no longer exists, and, in
diversity cases, federal courts should apply state law except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or acts of Congress. 159 Erie insinuated, however, that enclaves of federal common law still exist by stating that judicial action is permissible in matters the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States.160
Moreover, on the same day that the Court issued the Erie decision, it
also issued another decision written by the same author, Justice Brandeis.
The decision, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co,
states that the question of “whether the water of an interstate stream must
be apportioned between the two States is a question of ‘federal common
law,’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can
be conclusive.” 161 Hinderlider recognized that, notwithstanding the Erie
ruling, federal common law continues to exist in certain important
areas. 162 The Court acknowledged that prior Court decisions regarding
whether controversies involving interstate boundaries, waterways, and
compacts created a federal question were not uniform, 163 but ultimately
found that such controversies were “federal common law” and should
create a federal question.164 In fact, as discussed below, this may be one
of the very first cases that specifically lead to the notion that “federal
common law” presents a federal question for jurisdictional purposes.
The Hinderlider decision confirmed what had been developing for
some time: in matters affecting uniquely federal interests, federal courts
can develop and apply their own common law—federal common law. It
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See id.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
Id.
Id. at 811 n.12.
Id. at 811.
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since has been accepted that international law is one such area of federal
common law.
4. Courts Recognize Aspects of the Law of Nations as an Enclave of
Federal Common Law that Survived Erie.
Shortly after the Erie decision, Professor Philip Jessup wrote a wellknown law review article in which he argued that customary international law should be treated as federal common law. 165 He stated:
Any question of applying international law in our courts involves the
foreign relations of the United States and can thus be brought within a
federal power. . . .
....
It would be unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our
166
ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of international law.

This prediction came to fruition in the 1964 case Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino. 167 In Sabbatino, the Court applied the Act of State
Doctrine—an international law rule—as a matter of federal common law
when it dismissed a claim by an American commodity broker against
Cuba for title to sugar. 168 The Court recognized that it had the authority
to develop a common law rule because the doctrine is so important to
foreign relations. 169 In so doing, the Court notes that the “United States
courts apply international law as part of our own in appropriate circumstances . . . .” 170 The decision further states:
We are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules

165. Philip Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740 (1939).
166. Id.
167. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) (stating that the
Act of State doctrine dictates, as quoted in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897): “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”).
168. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426–27.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 423.
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like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v.
171
Tompkins.

It also notes, with approval, Professor Jessup’s proposition that rules of
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial
state interpretations, and that “[h]is basic rationale is equally applicable
to the act of state doctrine.” 172 The Sabbatino case is especially important
to the consideration of the issues addressed in this Article. There, the
Court did not directly apply international law or the law of nations, but
rather believed that it had the authority to develop federal common law
where a case might impact foreign affairs.173 In exercising this authority,
it explored international law and recognized a customary international
law rule in the development of federal common law. 174
Similarly, in the 1981 case of Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., the Supreme Court confirmed that “international disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations” is an area of law that
continues to exist as an enclave of federal common law. 175 According to
the Court in Texas Industries, courts can create federal common law either where there is specific Congressional authorization to do so or
where it is “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,” such as those
areas “concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States”
including “our relations with foreign nations.” 176 The Court continues:
In these instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy
to be resolved under state law, either because the authority and duties
of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because the
interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it inappro177
priate for state law to control.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa agreed that federal courts have the authority to create federal common law in certain areas.178 The Court recognized that Erie allows “limited enclaves” in which federal courts may
171. Id. at 425.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 423 (“The act of state doctrine does, however, have ‘constitutional’ underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a
system of separation of powers.”).
174. Id. at 421, 428–29.
175. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981), cited with
approval in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
176. Id. at 640–41.
177. Id. at 641 (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 (1972); Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)).
178. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
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derive some substantive federal common law. 179 The Sosa Court indicated that the law of nations or areas of federal relations is one such
area. 180
The cases discussed in this Part, including Jecker, The Paquette Habana, Hinderlider, Sabbatino, Texas Industries, and Sosa, all suggest that
federal courts have the authority to develop law in areas of uniquely federal interests, such as in cases affecting foreign relations. Further, the
cases suggest courts may look to customary international law and incorporate it into federal common law when appropriate. This is true whether
a court is recognizing a private claim for violations of federal common
law, as Court’s decision in Sosa indicates is within federal court’s power,
or applying a rule of decision in diversity cases where a judicial opinion
may impact foreign affairs.
A close analysis of these cases also leads to the conclusion that the law
of nations per se is not part of the “laws of the United States,” and customary international law is not wholly incorporated into our federal
common law. 181 Instead, when uniquely federal interests are involved,
the federal courts have common law authority to adopt certain rules of
customary international law, which in turn become federal common law.
D. Federal Common Law is Now Considered “Law of the United States”
for Purposes of Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
If federal common law did not exist at the time when the Constitution
was written, and was only coming into existence during the enactment of
general federal question jurisdiction in 1875, the ensuing question is
whether the “Laws of the United States” for Article III purposes include
modern federal common law, which in turn incorporates some aspects of
customary international law. A similar question is whether, given that
Congress in 1875 probably intended to confer jurisdiction to federal
courts through the enactment of federal question jurisdiction as expansively as allowed by Article III, 182 arising under “laws of the United
States” for purposes of § 1331 includes federal common law that incorporates, or recognizes, aspects of customary international law.
The Supreme Court has never clearly stated that federal common law
can be the basis of “Laws of the United States” under Article III. How179. Id. at 729; see also id. at 729 n.18 (noting that Sabbatino “further endorsed the
reasoning of a noted commentator who had argued that Erie should not preclude the continued application of international law in federal courts.”)
180. Id. at 729–30.
181. This is borne from the Court’s opinion in Sosa, which stated, “our federal courts
recognize customary international law.” Sosa, 541 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added).
182. See Skinner, supra note 51, at 69–72.
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ever, the Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois did clearly state that federal
common law could be the basis for § 1331 jurisdiction. 183 Some commentators argue that Milwaukee v. Illinois, as well as two dissenting opinions in other cases written by Justice Brennan, lead to the logical conclusion that Article III’s “Laws of the United States” includes federal
common law. 184 The fact that the Court has accepted that § 1331 jurisdiction is more narrow than the jurisdiction provided for in Article III 185
strengthens this view. Thus, if federal common law can provide jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331, it necessarily means that it provides for jurisdiction under Article III as well.
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Erie found that the term “laws of
the several states” found in § 34 of the First Judiciary Act (also known as
the Rules of Decision Act) 186 included state common law when deciding
what rules of decision should apply in diversity cases. 187 As such, it follows that “laws of the United States” in both, Article III and 28 U.S.C. §
1331 should also include common law of the United States, i.e., federal
common law.
Although the Supreme Court in Sosa did not address whether claims
for violation of the law of nations under the ATS “arise under the Constitution or Laws of the United States” for Article III purposes, its decision
indicates the Court’s belief that such claims arise under Article III’s
“Laws of the United States” as federal common law. But because this
issue was not raised or briefed by the parties, the Court did not have an

183. Illinois filed a lawsuit against four cities alleging that they were polluting Lake
Michigan and creating a public nuisance, and asked the lower courts to abate the nuisance. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93, 100 (1972) (citing Romero v. Int’l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring), which concluded that “laws” within the meaning of § 1331 embraced claims founded on federal
common law).
184. See, e.g., Note, Section 301(A) and the Federal Common Law of Labor Agreements, 75 YALE L. J. 877, 886 n.9 (1966); Jack Garvey, Repression of the Political Emigre—the Underground to International Law: A Proposal for Remedy, 90 YALE L.J. 78,
97 (1980); see also Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
185. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515–16 (1969); Verlinden v.
Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983); see also, Donald Doernberg, There’s
No Reason For It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages
the Purpose of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 608 (1987).
186. Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 725 (1940)) (“The laws of the several States, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where
they apply.”).
187. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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occasion to consider it directly. As noted in Part I, 188 when an ATS case
is between an alien and a citizen, Article III’s alienage provision provides for clear Article III constitutionality. 189 But when the case is between two aliens, as it was in Sosa, federal courts can exercise jurisdiction pursuant the ATS under Article III only if the claims meet the “arising under this Constitution, Laws of the United States” provision. 190 It
appears that the Court assumed that the ATS was constitutional under
Article III, even when the case involves an alien bringing suit against
another alien. This is due, in part, to the Sosa Court’s silence on this issue and its affirmation that federal courts have the power to recognize
certain tort claims for violation of the law of nations. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not challenge the holding in the ground-breaking 1980
ATS case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, which stated that the ATS was constitutional based on the “Laws of the United States” provision of Article
III. 191 Moreover, the Court cited Filartiga approvingly in other contexts. 192 This silence with respect to the ATS’s constitutionality, coupled
with the Court’s approval of Filartiga and its statement that “[f]or two
centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations,” 193 creates a fair assumption that the Supreme Court most likely agrees that the ATS is constitutional as between
two aliens under Article III’s “arising under the Laws of the United
States” provision as federal common law.
Finally, as analyzed above, 194 federal courts have the authority to develop federal common law in areas of unique federal interest, given the
ordering of the Constitution’s division of powers. The Constitutional divisions of responsibility between federal and state government arguably
provide for this implicit authorization. Where such implicit constitutional
division of issues occurs (e.g., in areas of foreign affairs), federal courts
should have the ability, when appropriate, to develop federal common
law in those areas of federal responsibility. Where such occurs, federal
common law should be considered law of the United States for purposes
of Article III and § 1331.

188. See discussion supra Section I.B.
189. Article III also provides for federal judicial power when a case is between citizens
of a state and citizens of a foreign state. Thus, for a case between two aliens to be constitutional under Article III, the case must arise under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
190. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004).
191. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
192. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 731–32.
193. Id. at 729.
194. See discussion supra Section II.C.4.–II.D.
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III. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §1331, FEDERAL COURTS HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO USE THEIR COMMON LAW POWER TO PROVIDE
REMEDIES BY RECOGNIZING PRIVATE CLAIMS FOR CERTAIN
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS.
A. Congress Understood When it Enacted 28 U.S.C. §1331 that Federal
Courts Would Use Their Common Law Power to Recognize Certain
Common Law Claims.
To the degree that common law claims alleging a violation of customary international law arise under the laws of the United States for purposes
of general federal question jurisdiction, federal courts can, and should,
have the common law power to provide remedies by recognizing such
private claims, even absent explicit statutory authorization. Although
related to the question of whether claims involving the law of nations
arise under the laws of the United States as federal common law, the
courts’ authorization to invoke their common law powers to provide a
remedy through recognition of the claim for such violations is a different
issue. Generally, there is a consensus that some type of authorization is
necessary for a federal court to provide a remedy for a violation of law
through the recognition of a private cause of action. 195 The issue is
whether the authorization needs to be explicit, such as a statute, as some
scholars suggest, 196 or whether it can be implicit in light of Congressional intent, Congressional understanding, or the Constitution’s division of
responsibilities. 197
In Sosa, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the ATS was a jurisdictional statute that did not itself create a cause of action, but held that
federal courts, through their common law power, could provide remedies
by recognizing aliens’ private claims for a limited set of violations of the
law of nations 198 as a matter of federal common law. 199 In other words,
the Court found that a private cause of action exists for certain international law violations but federal common law provides the claim in cases

195. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law, supra note 17, at 853–56; Stephens, supra note 13, at 435–36.
196. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law,
supra note 17, at 856–57.
197. Stephens, supra note 13, at 436–48.
198. The Sosa Court held that any claim brought today for violation of the law of nations under the ATS must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 18th Century
paradigms” recognized at the time—attacks on diplomats, safe conducts, and piracy. Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
199. Id. at 714, 724–25.
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brought under the ATS. 200 The Court found that Congress had implicitly
authorized the federal courts to use their common law powers to recognize these private claims because when Congress enacted the ATS in
1789, it did so with an understanding “that courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of
nations.” 201
The analysis employed by the Sosa Court is consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior holdings recognizing private causes of action where
the Court could ascertain that such was Congress’ intent, either expressly
or by implication. 202 In addition, there have been occasions when the
Court has recognized causes of action where it found that Congress assumed such remedies were available, or where the Court found an implied action existed because such private claims had been allowed previously. 203 Although these occasions involved Congressional assumptions in enacting statutes, there is no reason the same analysis should not
apply to common law claims. In fact, the analysis should be more applicable to claims arising from the common law. In those decisions where
the courts found private claims to implicitly arise from the statutes, Congress had the opportunity when it drafted such statutes to create causes of
action, but did not do so. With federal common law, Congress has had no
similar opportunity.
The analysis regarding implicit authorization employed by the Sosa
Court should also apply to § 1331, because it is a jurisdictional statute
just like the ATS. Thus, the question of whether federal courts are authorized to recognize causes of action for common law claims brought under
§ 1331 should be whether Congress understood when it enacted the statute in 1875 that federal courts would use their common law power to
recognize claims for common law tort violations.
Congress likely understood that federal courts would do so. As with
the ATS, when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it likely understood
that federal courts would use their common law power to recognize tort
200. Id. at 724 (“The jurisdiction grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number
of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”).
201. Id. at 714, 724, 731 n.19.
202. See, e.g., Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emp., 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15–
16 (1979); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 66, at 377–83.
203. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 380–82 (1982); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 383.
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claims, including claims for violations of the law of nations where those
claims implicated foreign relations.204 In fact, federal courts had been
recognizing private, common law tort claims for nearly 100 years. 205
Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Sosa, “torts in violation of the
law of nations were recognized as part of the common law” even in the
late 1700’s. 206 Federal courts recognized private claims for violations of
the law of nations in the late 1700’s, 207 and in 1875, those cases were still
good law. The Sosa Court cited two of these cases to support its position
that Congress assumed that private claims alleging violations of the law
of nations could be brought as part of the common law. 208
A review of cases decided in the1800’s demonstrates that during this
time, federal courts recognized private claims for violations of common
law generally, and law of nations specifically, without statutory authorization. The most common type of federal cases where private claims for
violations of the laws of nations were recognized as a matter of common
law was in the area of prize, 209 over which the courts had jurisdiction in
admiralty. Such cases included the 1855 case of Jecker v. Montgomery,
where the Supreme Court entertained a private, common law claim, 210 as
well as the 1862 Prize Cases, where the Supreme Court entertained four
common law private claims in which the plaintiffs alleged that their
ships’ capture and seizure as prize was unlawful.211
Other instances where federal courts recognized private claims for torts
as a matter of common law occurred in cases against military officers
and against civilians who were obeying the orders of military officers
during times of armed conflict. For example, in the 1849 case of Luther
204. See discussion supra Section II.C.2–II.C.3.
205. Skinner, supra note 51, at 101–07.
206. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714, 724.
207. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810, 811 (1795) (the court assumed it had jurisdiction under the ATS in suit for damages brought by a French privateer against the
mortgagee of a British slave ship); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 156–57 (1795) (holding
that Talbot, a French citizen who had assisted Ballard, a U.S. citizen, in unlawfully capturing a Dutch ship had acted in contravention of the law of nations and was liable for the
value of the captured assets); Moxon v. Fanny 17 F.Cas. 942, 948 (1973) (suggesting that
the claim could otherwise be heard even though the ATS was not the proper jurisdictional
statute in a case involving owners of a British ship seeking damages for its seizure in U.S.
waters by a French privateer because the suit could not be called one for a “tort only.”).
208. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
209. The Prize Cases—an area of tort in violation of the law of nations—were routinely brought before federal courts during the 1800’s. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862);
see also The Joseph, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 451 (1814); The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155
(1814).
210. Jecker, Torre & Co. v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855).
211. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 635.
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v. Borden, 212 the Supreme Court ruled that when martial law was imposed in Rhode Island after an insurgent uprising to overthrow the government, an officer could be held civilly accountable for acts willfully
done to an individual with more force than militarily necessary. 213 No
specific authorization for a private claim was cited, rather, such appears
to have been a matter of common law.
In the 1851 seminal case of Mitchell v. Harmony, 214 a U.S. citizen who
traded in Mexico during the U.S-Mexican War in an area under U.S.
control, brought a claim in federal court for the common law torts of
trespass and conversion 215 against an officer in the U.S. Army who had
seized and converted for his own use the plaintiff’s horses, mules, wagons, goods, chattels, and merchandise. 216 After rejecting defendants’
arguments that he was justified to act under the law of war, 217 the Court
allowed the private claim to go forward as a common law claim. 218
A review of the above cases, among others,219 demonstrates that federal courts routinely recognized private claims, including claims for violations of the law of nations, without the need for any specific authorization during the era when Congress enacted federal question jurisdiction.
It was assumed that the federal courts could use their common law power
to recognize private, civil claims. Thus, when Congress enacted § 1331
in 1875, it understood that federal courts would use their common law
powers to recognize private claims once they had jurisdiction over such
claims. As argued above, Congress also likely understood that § 1331
would create jurisdiction over the newly-developing federal common law
claims—i.e., those common law claims affecting uniquely federal interests, including those invoking the laws of nations which could affect foreign relations.
B. Response to the Sosa Court’s Skepticism Regarding § 1331
In response to Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion that the Court’s decision in Sosa would lead to federal question jurisdiction under § 1331
for claims of customary international law violations, 220the Court stated,
“[o]ur position does not . . . imply that every grant of jurisdiction to a
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
Id. at 38.
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
In this case, the Court had jurisdiction due to diversity of citizenship. Id. at 137.
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 133–35.
See generally Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 115.
See Skinner, supra note 51.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 745 (2004).
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federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop common law (so
that the grant of federal-question jurisdiction would be equally as good
for our purposes of § 1350).” 221 Moreover, although the Court confirmed
that “no development in the last two centuries has precluded federal
courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element
of common law,” 222 it stated that its opinion regarding the ATS was consistent with the division of responsibilities between federal and state
courts after Erie, 223 but that the same might not be true for “a more expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” 224
The Court’s skepticism regarding whether customary international law
claims fall under § 1331’s jurisdiction likely relates to concerns about
federal courts using their common law powers too broadly, recognizing
claims in a vast array of areas unrelated to uniquely federal interests, or
for actions Congress may never have intended or understood when it
enacted § 1331. Such use of federal common law powers would likely
not be consistent with Erie. However, use of common law power is consistent with Erie if federal courts only use their common law powers to
recognize and provide remedies for those claims of customary international law violations that entail uniquely federal interests, such as foreign
relations.
Erie ultimately was about the tension between federal and state power.
It contemplated and overturned the federal courts’ usurpation of state
judicial power in matters of local (not federal) concern. 225 But the Erie
decision did not address whether federal courts could use their federal
common law power to recognize claims in areas of clearly national interest. In fact, the Erie decision allows for certain enclaves of federal common law.
Federal courts can and should be able to use their common law power
to recognize claims for violation of the law of nations where the recognition of such claims may affect foreign relations. Such claims should fall
within the jurisdiction of federal courts, even where the claim is brought
by a U.S. citizen, given that such claims might impact foreign affairs either through the recognition of the claim, a finding that the claim is nonjusticiable, or through definitions of customary international law. Erie is
not to the contrary.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 731 n.19.
Id. at 724–25.
See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Sosa, 542 U.S., at 731 n.19.
See Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
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CONCLUSION
Claims alleging violations of customary international law that have the
potential to impact foreign affairs or other national interests should fall
within the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as federal common
law claims, which arise under the “laws of the United States.” Similarly,
such claims arise under the “Laws of the United States” for purposes of
Article III, and thus, their justiciability is constitutional. Federal courts
should also have the common law power to recognize and provide remedies for these claims, because Congress understood, when it enacted §
1331 in 1875, that federal courts would use their common law power to
recognize newly-emerging federal common law claims, just as both federal and state courts routinely recognized common law tort claims. As
long as this federal common law power is used to develop and recognize
claims that affect uniquely federal interests, such as foreign affairs, and
not claims affecting primarily state interests, this power is consistent
with Erie v. Tompkins and its progeny.

